



Director of
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ISRAEL-PALESTINIANS: Maneuvering on PLO Evacuation

Israeli leaders are being deliberately vague about their intentions, but they probably will not stop the PLO evacuation from Tripoli.

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The Israeli Government has refused to guarantee safe passage for the PLO.

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Comment: Tel Aviv clearly is opposed to the planned PLO evacuation under conditions that would allow Arafat to claim a political victory. Israeli leaders have welcomed the conflict between Arafat's forces and the Syrian-backed rebels and would like it to continue. They are concerned that Arafat will be able to portray his departure as a victory, as he did when he left Beirut last year.

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Israel is likely to stop short of using its armed forces to block the evacuation. Prime Minister Shamir probably recognizes that this could jeopardize relations with the US and the recently concluded agreements on political and military cooperation. The Israelis may engage in further harassment, however, to keep the PLO off balance and possibly to discourage third parties from assisting in the evacuation.

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KUWAIT: Terrorist Bombings

The bomb explosion that seriously damaged US Embassy facilities yesterday in Kuwait was one of six for which a group calling itself Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility. []

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In addition to the Embassy, the terrorists struck the French Embassy, a residential complex housing Americans, the airport control tower, an electric supply center, and a petroleum facility at Shuayba. A seventh bomb reportedly was defused at the Kuwait passport office. Callers identifying themselves as belonging to the same group had previously claimed four attacks in Lebanon against US, French, and Israeli targets, including the US Embassy in April and the headquarters of the US and French Multinational Force contingents in October. []

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Comment: Little is known about Islamic Jihad, although []

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[] it may be a cover name for Iranian agents or for Lebanese Islamic fundamentalists connected with Iran. []

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Kuwaiti officials have known since last July—and informed US officials—of threats to use truck bombs against the US Embassy. Kuwait's security forces, which probably are as good as those in most of the other Arab states in the Persian Gulf area, had taken heightened precautions. The sophistication of the closely timed bombings and the apparent ease with which they were carried out, however, underscore the vulnerability of other moderate governments in the region and Western facilities located in them. []

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Most of the explicit threats to bomb the US Embassy in Kuwait over the past six months have been attributed [] to Black June and other Syrian-backed extremist Palestinian groups. Iran, however, has trained hundreds of Shia youths from the Arab states of the Persian Gulf over the past four years in the use of explosives and terrorist tactics. If Iraq attacks Iran's export oil facilities, the Iranians are likely to attempt this type of terrorist attack against other US, French, and moderate Arab interests. []

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UN-CYPRUS: Debate on Peacekeeping Force

The mandate for the UN peacekeeping force on Cyprus probably will be extended this week, but debate on the issue could be contentious.

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The Turks and Turkish Cypriots say they cannot accept any mention of UN Resolution 541, which condemned the recent Turkish Cypriot declaration of independence and declared the new "state" illegal. They also want to delete references to the "Government of Cyprus" from the draft resolution.

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The Greek Cypriots insist on a reference to the "Government of Cyprus." Such language has been used in all UN resolutions dealing with the peacekeeping force since its establishment in 1964. Nicosia also wants the renewal mandate to note the Security Council's condemnation of Turkish Cypriot secession in order to underscore Ankara's isolation on the issue.

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The UN maintains a force of over 2,000 men. Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash has threatened on several occasions to restrict the movements of the force or to require the UN to sign a formal agreement with his administration.

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Comment: The Greek Cypriots will view any effort to delete mention of the "Government of Cyprus" as an attempt by the Turks and Turkish Cypriots to alter further the status quo. They almost certainly consider reference to UN Resolution 541 as a key part of their effort to forestall the consolidation of Turkish Cypriot independence.

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The Turks and Turkish Cypriots will oppose any reference to Resolution 541, but in the end they probably will accept mention of the "Government of Cyprus." Faced with the strong world reaction against Turkish Cypriot secession, they will not want to be seen as the intransigent party on this issue.

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USSR-PORTUGAL: Andropov's Protege Plans Visit

General Secretary Andropov's choice of his right-hand man, party secretary Gorbachev, to attend the congress of the Portuguese Communist Party this week supports other recent evidence of Gorbachev's improved standing as a potential successor. []

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Portuguese media have reported that Gorbachev, who is a full Politburo member, applied for a visa to attend the congress. There are no known contentious issues between the Soviet party and the Portuguese party, which is one of the most pro-Moscow in Western Europe. []

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Comment: Gorbachev handles party personnel matters for Andropov on the Secretariat, and he probably would not leave Moscow if Andropov's recent illness had led to an unresolved leadership crisis. [] Andropov arranged for Gorbachev to play a key role in handling party business during his absence. Soviet media, by heavily publicizing that a personal message from Andropov to a foreign visitor was relayed by Gorbachev, implicitly emphasized his continued access to the Soviet leader. []

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Attending the congress, like Gorbachev's trip to Canada last summer, strengthens his foreign affairs credentials. He should return to Moscow in time to prepare for the Central Committee plenum that is scheduled during the last week of December. []

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
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MEXICO: Curbs on Leftist Group

President de la Madrid's suspension of financial support to the small Communist-dominated Mexican Peace Movement underscores his commitment to a less provocative foreign policy. The front group is a frequent critic of US policy in the region. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] De la Madrid, however, later allowed the group to organize an emergency meeting of the World Peace Council to protest the US intervention in Grenada. [REDACTED]

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Comment: De la Madrid's action against the front group parallels other efforts to clamp down on domestic leftists and suggests he is moving away from the predilection of previous administrations to try to promote revolutionary change. The decision reflects the President's desire to prevent splits in the ruling party, which could jeopardize economic recovery, and to maintain cordial relations with the US. Nevertheless, domestic political considerations and de la Madrid's belief that social and economic inequities are at the root of regional instability probably rule out basic shifts in Mexican policy.

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WESTERN EUROPE: Anti-INF Protests

Demonstrations last weekend marking the fourth anniversary of NATO's INF decision drew about the same number of people as last year, but factions in the "peace" movement disagree about future actions. Press reports state that nearly 10,000 people participated in protests in West Germany. In the UK, police arrested about 60 people out of a crowd of 10,000 to 20,000 for trying to destroy sections of the perimeter fence around the INF site at Greenham Common. In Italy, several thousand persons in Florence and Milan demonstrated against US and Soviet nuclear weapons. []

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Comment: Effective police action apparently averted major incidents. Although protest organizers have frequently said that they will begin to use new tactics, they have not found ways to heighten the impact of demonstrations. In West Germany, moreover, jealousy and differences in aims among the Greens, the Communists, and the Social Democrats are an increasingly serious problem. Without a new weapons issue to stimulate renewed cooperation, mass action probably will become more difficult, and there is likely to be more emphasis on decentralized activity. []

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FRANCE-US: Opposition to Credit Proposal

France is expected to oppose a US proposal at the OECD Export Credit Arrangement meetings this week in Paris to raise downpayments from 15 to 40 percent for the USSR and other more developed countries. US Embassy sources report that Finance Minister Delors, who wants to continue to promote French exports, argues that raising the downpayment would violate terms of a French-Soviet agreement. Other participants generally support the US proposal, although West Germany and Sweden believe 20 to 25 percent would be more reasonable. []

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Comment: The French probably will block an EC consensus and prevent a compromise on the US proposal. France is especially concerned that it reduce its current account deficit, which reached \$12 billion in 1982. Paris has resisted previous US efforts to align the OECD Arrangement with market conditions, and it has sought to preserve its official credit subsidies to keep its exports competitive. []

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BANGLADESH: Ershad's Political Strategy

Chief Martial Law Administrator Ershad has proclaimed himself President and released two major opposition leaders from custody. Military rule continues, with Ershad remaining in charge of the armed forces and the Martial Law Administration. [REDACTED]
 Ershad is negotiating with the key centrist political leader and may be willing to make some political concessions to her. [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]

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Comment: Ershad's political moves are aimed at forestalling a recurrence of the political violence of two weeks ago. By assuming the presidency, he apparently hopes to gain support for portraying himself as a civilian leader before reaching agreement with the moderate opposition on the timing of elections. The centrist politicians fear that leftist violence would thwart any hope of political compromise. They are likely to tone down their protests until they determine whether Ershad is seriously willing to negotiate. [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]

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The US Embassy in Georgetown reports that the Soviet Ambassador has stated that Guyana has requested armored cars, helicopters, and automatic weapons from the USSR to defend itself against a border incursion by Venezuela or Suriname. President Burnham also is said to have requested arms from North Korea and East Germany. Most of the weapons now in Guyana's inventory have been provided by the British, but small quantities of arms have been supplied in the past by North Korea, East Germany, Cuba, and Yugoslavia. [REDACTED]

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Comment: Guyana's interest in acquiring more arms is not new. Burnham also is worried about the deteriorating economic situation and accompanying political and social unrest. [REDACTED]
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Special Analysis

JORDAN: Hussein and the Peace Process

King Hussein is evaluating the options available to him for moving the peace process forward as a result of the struggle within the PLO and Syria's improved role in the region. He continues to reject a unilateral move by Jordan because of its vulnerability, and he has been unsuccessful in finding an alternative Palestinian leadership in the West Bank. Once Yasir Arafat is safely out of Tripoli, Hussein probably will be forced to resume his dialogue with the weakened but still popular PLO chief. The King will not risk making a bold move to revive the peace process, however, without clear indications of Arab and US support and without Israeli signs of willingness to make concessions.

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Arafat's failure to secure PLO approval for an accommodation with Hussein last spring left the King with little room to maneuver. He remains committed to the decision made at the Arab Summit in Rabat in 1974 that named the PLO the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

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An official government announcement last May that Jordan would no longer consider the agreement reached at Rabat valid if the PLO came under Syrian domination indicated Hussein's willingness to try to exploit divisions in the PLO. The lack of support from his Arab allies for voiding the Rabat decision, however, discouraged him from pursuing an independent course.

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Recent statements by the King implying that he may reconvene the lower house of Jordan's parliament—half of whose members by law are West Bank Palestinians—also suggest that he is considering steps he could take if he should decide to withdraw Jordan's commitment to the Rabat decision. Reinstating parliament now appears largely a response to domestic pressure to expand the government's decisionmaking mechanism. Such a move, however, also would put Hussein in a better position to create a group outside the PLO with a claim to represent the Palestinians.

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Arafat's continued broad-based support among West Bankers forces Hussein to move cautiously. The King is in frequent contact with West Bank leaders, and he has quietly encouraged them to become more independent of the PLO. Nonetheless, they have been unwilling thus far to commit themselves—leaving Hussein with no other alternative but to try again eventually to work out an accommodation with the PLO.

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Resuming the Dialogue With Arafat

Arafat's standing almost certainly will increase if he makes a successful exit from Tripoli, which many Palestinians would consider a victory over the PLO radicals. As a result, Hussein will not risk challenging Arafat's position without strong support from key Arab governments for such a move. []

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Hussein acknowledged as much recently, when he stated that Arafat could come to Amman for talks without any conditions. Such a statement contradicts Hussein's earlier position that Arafat was welcome only if he was ready to accept the agreement worked out last April for a joint team composed of Jordanians and non-PLO Palestinians to enter negotiations. []

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The King will continue to urge Arafat to accept the US peace initiative, instead of the plan drawn up at the Fez Summit, as the only workable approach to negotiations. The definition of the "association" between Jordan and the West Bank called for in the US plan, however, will be a major stumblingblock. []

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Arafat is unlikely to accept less than the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, which would later be tied to Jordan. In Hussein's view, such a position would be unacceptable. []

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A Need for Arab Assurances

Hussein's prospects in dealing with Arafat still hinge on securing the support of a majority of Arab governments, particularly Saudi Arabia. The King recently emphasized the need to abandon the practice of requiring unanimity in Arab decisionmaking. Majority rule would deny Syria a veto over the peace process. []

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The Syrians and the radical Palestinians recently tried to intimidate Hussein by carrying out a series of terrorist acts against Jordanian targets at home and abroad. Although the attacks were ostensibly in response to the arrest in Amman of agents of Abu Nidal's Black June organization, Damascus also probably intended them as a warning to Hussein not to revive his discussions with Arafat. Hussein's threat of retaliation will not deter Syria in its efforts to prevent any agreement between Hussein and Arafat that does not take Syrian interests into account. []

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US guarantees will play a key role in influencing Hussein and in shaping his ability to persuade Arafat and the Arab moderates that they have something to gain from participating in the peace process. In addition to promises of military support against a Syrian threat, Hussein will look for assurances that the US will urge Israel to withdraw from Lebanon and to freeze settlements on the West Bank.

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US vetoes of UN resolutions condemning Israeli actions and the recently announced US-Israeli strategic cooperation agreement have intensified Arab doubts about Washington's willingness to take a hard line with Tel Aviv. []

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Outlook

Hussein is unlikely to make any far-reaching decisions on the peace process in the near term, despite his growing sense of urgency that Israeli settlement activity and resettlement of Palestinian refugees outside the camps are designed to force emigration from the West Bank. Nonetheless, he will use new talks with Arafat to return attention to the broader peace issue. []

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After his experience of last April, Hussein also will be extremely wary of any agreement he extracts from Arafat. Hussein may believe he can induce Arafat to compromise while he is in a weakened position. The King, however, will still have difficulty in persuading Arafat that an association with Jordan is the only way to salvage any of the West Bank. []

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